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1he Russians Acted Like the Russians'~ 
The 'Othering' of the Soviet Union in the 
Reader's Digest, 1980-90 1 
by Joanne P. Sharp 
Deparbnentof Geography 
Syracuse University 
The increasingly widespread introduction of discursive theory into 
academic research has highlighted the ideological construct of 
(re)presentations of social 'reality.' Nowhere is this more prevalent than 
within the realm of popular conceptions of geopolitics. Here geography is 
manipulated in such a way as to produce an 'objective' reading of the spatial 
processes and place-bound characteristics of world politics.1bere is no such 
thing as a universal geopolitics, however; each theorization is firmly rooted 
within the cultural assumptions of a particular national subject position. 
Those existing outside the nation-state boundaty of the defining theory (and 
thus its ideological assumptions) become characterised as Other, a concept 
which, by definitio~ is inherently tied to the ideological perception of the 
national Self. 
The Reader's Digest Is America's most read magazine. Despite the fact 
that in themajorityof cases,itsarticlesaredrawnfromothersources,editorial 
selection provides a coherent textual creation which represents current 
issues and their relevance to the American reader. One does not require a 
detailed deconstruction of The Reader's Digest (hereafter RD) to realise that it 
presents a very conservative, and characteristically Ame~can, discourse. 
Although any text produces multiple readings, the RD would appear to 
be sufficiently coherent and· recursive to mold certain · popular images. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the creation of an Other, here the Soviet 
Union in RD' s geopolitical model, produces a reading which reveals as much 
about the ideological values of the Self as it does the character of the Other. 
Before turning to look at the text itself, I think it is important to state the 
definitions of the textual theory which I will use to deconstruct the RD's 
discourse of the Soviet Union. 
Theoretical Construct of the 'Other' 
One could argue that the RD has created a discursive field of Soviet 
Othemes.5 through its manipulation of a particular model of geopolitics to 
explain the role of the USA and U$R in the world system. It is necessary to 
unpack the meaning of this statement before presenting the outlines of the 
RD' s discursive field. 
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It is becoming a widely accepted view that there is no such thing as 
transparent writing; texts are not mimetic of 'reality' but are representations 
of the 'reality' they seek to convey (Macdonell, 1986). Geopolitics is one 
example of textual representation. Conventionally it is seen as a practical and 
'objective' attempt at relating geography to international politics. But 
geography is not objective. It is a form of power /knowledge, a "social and 
historical discourse always intimately bound up with questions of politics 
and ideology" (0 Tuathail and Agnew, 1991:5). Although a geopolitical 
discourse may claim to mirror the 'real' situation, this reflection is in fact 
necessarily coloured with the ideology of the writer's and reader's subject 
positions. 
S ince the European Enlightenment, subject positions have been tied to 
the notion of national identity. In realist theories of politics, ~world-system 
is formed bya series of territorial nation-states. These have become naturalised 
to the extent that their ontological validity and legitimacy as basic units of 
analysis and identity are rarely questioned. Certainly this is the hegemonic 
explanationimplidtinmuch 'popular' geopolitics. Discretenational identities 
are thus fundamental to the understanding of modern subject positioning. 
National ideology is also presumed to be natural and thus universal despite 
its evident construction. This exclusive definition of national identity creates 
a clear delineation between those people adopting Cl$umed 'universal' 
values within the national territory and all those outside practicing different, 
and inferior, values. 
This process of 'Othering' those beyond one's national borders is 
reinforced by orthodox W estem philosophy which is based in a tradition of 
logocentric hierarchical dualisms. The Other becomes "the excluded against 
which behavior is judged and defined; the mad defines the sane, the deviant 
the nonnal" (Dalby, 1988:417). 
It would be deterministic to suggest that any representation of an Other 
is automatically accepted by a national populace. The oonstruction of a 
hegemonic discursive field of Otherness thus involves the creation of many 
discourses of difference so that, in any aspect of human life, the Other is 
posited as fundamentally different from the national Self. 
Historically, the most acknowledged example of Othering - if only 
because of the literature it has generated, both supportive and critical - is 
Orientalism. This was the creation of a European Other at the time of 
coloniz.ation which effectively homogeniz.ed the many cultures stretching 
from Northern Africa to Japan into a single presence. 
Edward Said' s(l 979) exposeof Orientalism was one of the first and most 
comprehensive deconstructions of the myth of the Other. I refer to the 
Orientalist discourses uncovered by Said to help disentangle the discursive 
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field of the Soviet Other in the RD. Ido, however,divergefromSaid'sanalysis 
when looking at power relations inherent in these disrourses. 1he power 
relations in the two cases are quite different and this affects the nature of the 
discourses brought into play in each case. Before exploring this in greater 
detail, I will provide a brief account of my research methodology. 
Methodology 
The data for this study is drawn from articles from the RD in the years 
1980-1990. The RD was chosen because of its unmatched circulation figures. 
Although I am aware that the readership of this magazine is not entirely 
representative of the American populatio~ I think that the sheer size of 
readership justifies research into its posmble appeal and influence. The 
particular time period was chosen because of the remarkable changes taking 
place in the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Ideological a$umptions, I have 
presumed, become especially prominent in order to cope with times of 
change and uncertainty. The individual articles were chosen from the 
contents page of each issue: any entry which appeared to have connections 
with the Soviet Union was selected for close reading. 
Difference 
The RD relies heavily on conventional images of ·the Other in the 
construction of articles on the Soviet Union. Of the eighty Soviet iterm in the 
period studied there was only one which was sympathetic to the Soviet case 
-a report on the December1988 Annenianearthquake,butthiswasoonstructed 
as a human tragedy beyond geopolitical bounds. And, even this was 
darkened with "the specter of a bureaucrat unwilling to deliver bread to a 
village because there was no surviving official to sign for it'' (various, 
1989:145). No articlesatteinpt to liken the Soviets to Americans. Instead, their 
differences were always systematically highlighted.2 
This is facilitated by homogenizing the Other. For example, despite the 
fact that the USSR encompasses over one hundred national groups, the temlS 
Soviet and Russian are used interchangeably. Phrases such as "totalitarian," 
"the Soviets have reacted in character'' and ooncentration upon bureaucratic 
"red tape and oorruption" also produce a monolithic picture of the US.SR. 
Articles are rarely about individual people, instead the tendency is to 
dichotomize between the Soviet people and the Soviet system. Obviously, 
problems of restricted access to infonnation have had much to do with this, 
however, the Soviet individual is perceived to be clearly subservient to the 
state. 
There are several exceptions which in fact reinforce this disrourse. 
Firstly,politicalleadersandimportantspiesaregivenindiVidualdescription 
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and articles are devoted to their exploits (rorruption and manipulation in the 
former case, action threatening America and freedom in the latter.) It co~d 
be argued that this reinforces the picture of a homogeneous population 
unquestioningly following the dictates of their (obviously corrupt and 
untrustworthy) leaders. The second group of Soviets who merit individual 
description are dissenters. This inclusion of those opposed to the system, 
whether because of persecution or for ideological reasons, also enforces the 
homogenized stereotype rather than undermining it. For there is an inherent 
tautology in the construct of the Other. In other words, Soviet action is 
described,eitherexplicitly,ormoreimplicitlybyrelyingon theintertextuality 
of cultural construct, in terms of a set of characteristics which will be 
described below. Any alternative activity is therefore regarded as non-
Soviet. "These people belonged in spirit to the Western intelligentsia,~' 
explains one ethnographic article on Ru$ians ~ifer, 1980:2~) .-.the anti-
Soviet expressions of this group places them outside the neat definition of the 
Other. Emigres such as Sakarov are given the same treatment. Such people 
are not within the definition of "Soviet" and as they are a small yet vocal 
minority they are able to stand outside of the constructed Other. 
Thisleavesamas5populationradicallydifferentfrom,andincompatible 
with, the American populace. The fundamental and inherent diff~ 
perceived as separating Soviets and Americans can be illustrated with 
phrases such as 
we failed ... because we continued to believe that the Russians would or could 
think like us (Rowny, 1981, p. 70) 
Did they suppose that Moscow would react the way Americans did (Safire, 
1986, p. 71) 
This disrourse is taken to an extreme in an article which appeared in the 
July 1981 edition. The story is of an American who required a blood 
transfusion after surgery in Siberia. He was given local blood which his body 
appeared to reject. The text indicates that there is not usually any problem 
when a patientis given ''blood of the same type but of different ethnic origin" 
(Knaus, 1981,p.125).ltisa~ttedthatthebloodmaynothavebeenproperly 
screened before transfusion, but a more revealing question is left hanging: 
Is his body rejecting the Russian blood? (p. 125) 
Perhaps the implications of this statement are not as damning as I am 
implying. However, the story ends with the patient being airlifted from 
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Siberia just before Soviet surgeons have the chance to open him up once 
more. In the heliropter, they give him another bansfusion: 
My theory is right! Jim's body is accepting the American blood. (p127) 
Placing a nationality on biological characteristics seems somewhat 
extreme, and produces a reading which suggests that Americans and Soviets 
really are fundamentally inrompatible. However, such statements about 
difference might not ring true for the reader without some fonn of evidential 
support. This comes in the fonn of a number of discourses which compose 
RD' s discursive field of Soviet Othem~. 
Time 
As with Said's description of European Orientalism, RD's discursive 
field of the Soviet Other contains two contradictory disc0urses of time. 
(a) Timele~ne~: Many articles in RD imply an unchanging Soviet 
character: 
Ever since grabbing p0wer in 1917, Soviet leaders have proclaimed their 
intention to fight for the world-wide triumph of communism. (Chapple, 1982, 
p. 70) 
Stalin is still smiling. (Barron, 1~ p. 111) 
They could be seen for what they really were - a modem Mongol horde ... 
<Elliott, 1986, p. 96) 
Even the changes wrought by the Gorbachev administration are regarded as 
only superficial, they are just "polishing the facade": 
Is Russia Really Changing? 
Don't bet on it .. .along comes a new Bolshevik leader, 
Mikhail Gorbachev. (Lasky, 1988, pp. 71-4) 
But when Gorbachev talks about correcting the mistakes of the Stalin ~ he 
does not mean correcting the underlying socialist system. (Evans and Nov~ 
1987, p. 92) 
The underlying nature of the Soviet system is perceived to be set in roncrete 
and therefore unlikely to change in the future any more than it has been seen 
to have changed in the past. RD articles calibrate Soviet history by leader 
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character. Subtexts of repression and threatening behavior run through this 
periodization, however, which limit the effect of its historical differentiation. 
(b) Degeneration: there are a similar number of articles which employ the 
trope of degeneration to corivey the development of the Soviet Union into its 
current antipodean ideological position. One use of this trope is to hark back 
to pre-Revolutionary Rusm to highlight the potential of the nation if it had 
been left to develop 'naturally': 
Why is Russ~ a net exporter of food under the czars, chronically dependent on 
food imports? (Satter, 1989, p. 62) 
. . 
More often though, degeneracy is viewed as a deviation from Marxist texts, 
in much the same way as European Orientalists charted Muslim societies' 
deviation from ancient Islamic writings: 
Government and Communist Party officials had become a privileged class in 
what, according to Marxist theory, was a classless society. (G~th, 1981, p.102) 
S everal of the tales of indiVidual escape from U$R indicate that these 
people had been strong believers in the Soviet regime but have become 
disillusioned by "the system's crippling defects and cruelties, the endl~ 
consumer shortages, the staggering wastage and inefficiency'' (Peifer, 198.5, 
p. 183). Post glasnost tales of worker slacking and drunkenness also provide 
fertile ground for exposing Soviet system bankruptcy. 
The last world empire is collapsing. (Bennett, 1989, p. 99) 
Irrationality 
The discursivefieldofSovietOth~in the RD is strengthened by the 
discourse of irrationality which runs through many of the articles in the 
period studied. Descriptionsof inexplicableSovietrationalehelps to reinforce 
the notion that they can never be like Americans because they even think 
differently. · · 
Bolshevik rule reduced the land to ruin (Simo~ 1988, p. 68) 
The nonsensical farm system that undermines hopes of pro~ in the Soviet 
Union. (Satter, 1989, p. 61) 
ThisdiscourseconveystheimagethatSoviet'rationality'isso.divergentfrom 
the American (norm) that they can never equal US achievements or adopt an 
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American way of life (just as Orientals oould never match Europeans' 
superior knowledge and its application.) Descriptio~ of Soviet inefficiency 
and wastage also feed into this characterisation: 
It was a nuclear power plant run by the Marx Brothers_. (Elliott, 1987, p. 132) 
Our New Embassy- Bungled and Bugged (Barro~ 1987, p. 100) 
Environmental Determinism 
The cruder fonns of Orientalism rely heavily on environmental 
detenninism in the creation of incompabble cultures. There are only three 
significant instances of environmental tropes in my data but I think they 
merit mention. 
The only article entirely devoted to environmental conditions was 
entitled ''R~ Winter" (Feifer, 1984, p. 97-100). Harsh northern Soviet 
weather is deemed "a prime cause and a symbol ofRU$ia's fate, it molds an 
attitude towards life" (p. 98). The text takes the importance of climatic 
influence on Soviets to an even greater extreme: · 
Thanks at least in part to their clima~ Russians perceive the outside world as 
hostile,and yet enviable too. Going deeper, what is usually shrugged off as 'bad 
luck' can also be seen as punishment; like handicapped children, Russians feel 
that they are 'not like the others,' and tend to blame themselves for the stigma 
and hardship. (p. 100) 
Environmental influence in the other two articles is not· so deterministic. 
Instead, description of place appears to be more aesthetic: the landscape is 
given colour depending on the level of American recognised freedom 
existing there. In an article on Soviet intervention in the Persian Gulf, Soviet 
backed North Yemen is descnbed as a "dark and bloody land" (Reed, 1980, 
P· 63), whereas Saudia Arabia is placed next to the "sun-sparkled Persian 
Gulf' (p. 65). Towns in the Baltic states struggling for freedom against "the 
Kremlin Goliath" are "graceful and pleasing in oontrast to the drabness and 
sameness of most Soviet cities" (Evans and Novak, 1990, p. 127-37). 
A Soviet 'Orient'? 
Although much of the RD's Soviet discourse can be deronstructed 
~atly by the discourses unveiled in Sclld's work on the Orient, there are 
unportant deviations. The goal of Sclld' s work was to explore the power 
r~tions involved in the. construction and rise to hegemony of particular 
discourses rather than attempting to replace the Oiientalists' discourse with 
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his own. His work, in other words, was concerned with access to power. 
Orientals have had relatively little power in their relations with Europe and 
thus their discourses were easily suppressed. Herein lies the great difference 
between Said's Orient and the Other in this study. The Soviets have 
traditionally had next to no acces.5 to the dominant discourses in America, 
particularly in a publication such as the RD, but it would be ~le to 
suggest that the U$R lacks power. Moreover, although in earlier periods 
Islamic societies were perceived as posing a mysterious and threatening 
presence, in the nineteenth century the European Orient was more or le$ 
congruentwithcolonial extension and, by implication, European know ledge 
systems. In contrast, the Soviet Other is 'contained' within a _territory which 
has been, until recently, a somewhat grey area in Western knowledge 
systems and thus the pos.5ibility of power fonnation through knowledge has 
been limited. This lack of knowledge presents a very threatening presence. 
I will now turn to a disawion of the discourses relating to evil and strength 
which form the difference between these discursive fields. 
Evilness and Threatening Behavior 
Integral to their depiction as somehow inherently different from 
Americans, is the RD' s Othering of the Soviets by way of their threatening 
behavior and evilnes.5. Indeed, this discourse was invoked more than twice 
as often as any of the others examined in this study. In its weakest fonn, this 
discourse presents the Soviets as uncompromising and always ready to take 
advantage of unsuspecting Americans who are striving to play the game by 
its rules: 
The Soviets do not believe in compromise. There is no Russian equivalent to the root 
word of the English 'rompromise.' The Soviets have adopted our word, but not 
embraced our meaning. ThesearchforareasonabJemiddleground of agreement, 
the heart of the Western sense of negotiation, is foreign to them. Soviet 
negotiators regard compromise as a sign of weakness. (Rowny, 1981, p. 67) 
However, this discourse is usually employed in a more extreme version 
leaving the reader with little chance to question the intentions of the Soviet 
Union towards innocent America: 
66 
There are only two major powers in the world today, and the Soviets keep doing 
theonethingtheydowell, which is to build military forces. (Koster, 1983, p. 95) 
The Soviet Union has created a massive nuclear stockpile that seems to be 
designed for the destruction of the United States, rather than as a deterrent to 
an attack on the US.SR (Jastrow, 1986, p. 78) 
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The Russian Knife at America's Throat. (Bennett and Mallin, 1984 p. 88) 
Metaphors evoking popular fixed-form geopolitical models also enforce the 
concept of a threateningpTesencein the USSR: the texts are littered with terms 
such as "containment," "imperialism" and "expansionism." It is suggested 
that if the US let up pressure upon the Soviet borders Europe would 
automaticaly fall: 
If we allow the nuclear balance to tip strongly in Moscow's favor, Western 
Europe will inevitably be brought under predominantly Soviet influence. 
(Griffith, 1980, p. 149) . 
Sexuality and Gender 
Intertwined with,and supporting,discoursesof evilnessand threatening 
~viour arethoseroncemingsexuality and gender. Said describes Europe's 
Orient as very highly sexualised. Sexual activity, especia11y in deviant forms, 
has been a prominent element of many Orientalist discourses. 'There has, in 
contrast, been only one article in the RD in the decade studied which has 
focused on Soviet sexuality. Entitled "Is There Sex in RuSsia?" (Popovsky, 
1982, p. 134-8), the article's tone sugests the answer is 'no', that state 
r:i'ression has undermined sexual activity to such an extent that declining 
birth rates have forced the state into the role of Cupid (although, of course, 
"··.the Soviet Cupid ... brandishes the iron fist of authoritarianism")(p. 137). 
H~wever, the article leaves the reader with a message more familiar to an 
Orientalist-type definition of Other sexual appetites: 
To some people in a democratic society, the powerful taboos of a totalitarian 
state may seem a panacea for raging sexual folly. But illnesses that are covered 
up tend to rage even stronger and the prognosis grows more dire. (p. 138) 
~gendering of the USSR seems to be the opposite to that of the Orient. RD 
articles do not evoke the West's penetration or subjugation of its Other. 
Instead the Soviet Union is pictured as the aggressor or the forceful masculine 
courter. One article speaks of a "flirtation with Mo5cow'' (Reed, 1980, p. 6.5), 
another of "a garrison state ronstantly flexing its military muscle" (Bennett, 
1989, p. 102). 
At times, however, it seems that the Soviets are not human at all. Images 
of ~ Soviet ''bear'' are not infrequent and one article described. a Soviet 
buggmgoperationasan "electronic.zoo" (Barron, 1989, p.193).Frankenstein's 
mo~ter is evoked when one text refers to the USSR ·as "the huge, ill-
coooeved creation of some mad scientist" (Bennett, 1989,. p. 99). 
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The 'Evil Empire' -Almost an American Creation? 
S aid states that the Orient was almost a European creation. Is the RD 
discourse of the Soviet Union just one amongst many equally valid 
interpretations of this country? Or, in the spirit of Said' s statement, is there 
something beyond the discourse; does the succes.s of the RP discourse lie in 
its resonancewithinfonnation that readers have gleaned from other sources? 
I tis unlikely in this communications age that many readers gain all their 
international infonnation from the RD. This text cannot be viewed in 
isolation as readers will bring interpretations from other texts (including 
television, newspapers, political speeches and so on) to their reading of the 
RD. There is a consensus on many 'facts' related to the international situation 
and the ultimate authority of the body, violated by torture and war, testifies 
to the ontological reality of some a~ive actions. RD' s Othering of the 
Soviet Union is thus better seen, like Orientalism, as "a set of constraints on 
andlimitationsofthoughtthanitissimplyasapositivedoctrine"(Said, 1979, 
p. 42). The RD's USSR is therefore not arbitrary but instead an intertextual 
frame of reference that is created for its readers through which to inteipret 
any empirical evidencewhiChcomes to light. This helps to explain, therefore, 
how it is that the RD' s discourses on the USSR have taken so long to integrate 
the notion of change in that country. Although the discourses are slowly 
evolving, they posses.s a high degree of inertia; the proces.5 of discourse 
change (let alone changes in the broader discursive field of the Other) is a 
slow one because of the self-perpetuating nature of such descriptions. This 
inertia is rooted within the purpose of RD' sdiscursivefield of SovietOthe~ 
I would like to conclude with an examination of the role the RD projects for 
itself, and how the discourses it draws upon are manipulated to this end as 
the Soviet Union changes. 
Conclusion: The Reader's Digest as Guardian of American Morals 
Extremes aside, cautious people favor defense. The less we spend on defense, 
the greater the risk of war. (Koster, 1983, p. 91) 
'Cautiouspeople'readRD.Thismagazineprojectsanold-fashioned'conuron 
sense' account of world events. This view produces one more discourse 
which, I would argue, both draws upon and shapes the other discourses 
described above in order to facilitate the RD's mission: a discourse of 
morality. I would like to suggest that this moral discourse stems from the 
RD' s concern to represent the US as the benevolent hegemon. This view 
invokesa "nationalexceptionalism" (Agnew, 1987, p.8)whichbydestinyhas 
to spread American ideals and institutio~ throughout the post-war world 
order which it shaped. Agnew (1987) traces this back to the very fonnation 
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of the US as a nation-state where the nature of expansion into America and 
itsreleasefromcolonialismhasplaced USideologywithinaspatially abstract 
concept of 'homeland of liberty' rather than within the finite territorial 
bounds of nation-state. It is this Otherness, the USSR cannot measure up - it 
is "a moral void" <Barron, 1983, p. 214). 
The time period covered bythisstudywasoneof apparent great change 
in ~-Soviet Uni~~ The ne~ 'o~' ~f glasnost produced a challenge to 
traditional definitions of Soviet unmorality. The RD has reacted in two ways 
to this change, each of which is used to create an unsettliilg possible future 
world-order. Both reactions expose the RD' s claim to the moral high ground 
~f US paternalistic hegemony. First, by prioritizing the discourse of 
timel~, the RD projects the idea of the inability of the Soviet Union to 
change: 
Even if reforms were broadened substantially, the Soviet Union would remain 
a totalitarian dictatorship. (&mes, 1988, p. 89) 
A~reextremeversionofthisisthesuggestionthatGorbachev'srefonnsare 
no different from those policies introduced by Lenin. The RD does not hold 
out bright hopes for the USSR to become more like America: 
~rba~ev mar:··be dooming his best intentions by perpetuating the veiy 
ideological-political forces that directly led to Stalinism. <Bennett, 1989, p. 103) 
Secondly, and on the surface perhaps more curious, is a fear of the apparent 
~rality of Gorbachev's refonns per se. As highlighted above, the RD is 
highly sceptical of the authenticity of Soviet change and fears the influence 
of ~'too many Gorbachev boosters" (Nixon in Barnes, 1988, p. 89) in the West 
Wid~pread aoceptance of Gorbachev' s project has become the new threat to 
Amencan moral hegemony: 
Gorbachev' s nuclear-weapon-free-world proposal was onl~ an attempt to woo 
public opinion in the west (Ade~ 1989, p. 69) · 
His goal, the most ambitious ever sought by a Soviet leader, has profound meaning 
for the Western alliance. It is nothing~ than achieving, in the eyes of the world, 
full moral equivalence with the United States <RosenthaL 1988, p. 71) 
~' it is implied, will all be done without changing the fundamentals of the 
Soviet system, but,itisfeared,onlythosepeoplewhohaveread theRDknowthis. 
. T~ RIYs discursive field of Soviet Otherness is premised upon the moral 
distancing of the two superpowers - if the two begin to ronveige, the 
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Iogocentric dualism of Self and Other will ro~~ and.~ RD'sexplanatoty 
framework must change significantly to maintain legitimacy: 
It is hugely important to Moscow that the world believe there is no great 
difference between us. (RosenthaL 1988, p. 72) . 
... ishugelyimportantto TheRellder' s Digest,and traditional,ronservative 
values of American hegemonic 'benevolence', that they do not 
APPENDIX: Discourses Implicit in The Reader's Digest Articles 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
• 
70 
(by topic) 
DISCOURSES 
evil/ threatening 
homogeneity 
fixed-form geopolitics 
sexuality I gender 
non-human 
environmental determinism 
timelessness 
degeneration 
irrationality 
American oommon sense/ morality 
TOT AL NUMBER OF ARTICLES= 
NO.OF TIMES 
INVOKED 
51 
20 
10 
4 
6 
3 
20 
15 
20 
13 
80 
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ARTICLFJ TOPIC YEAll DISCOURSE(S) 
ABCD~FGHI • 
MILITARY 
What Price Superpower 1980 A c 
Standing Up to the Russian Bear A COE 
The Real Stakes in Afghanistan A c E G 
Russia's Real Target A D F 
Soviet Military Might A 
Poland's Strike for Freedom 1981 A c H 
Ban Whose Bomb? 1982 A D 
The Russian Knife at America's Throat A 
Dangerous Myths About Nuclear Arms A 
What You Should Know About America's Defense 1983 AB G • 
Afghanistan: the Soviet Lesson 1984 AB 
Poison&: Plague: Russia's Secret Terror Weapons A 
Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War A 
US Eyes Over Russia 1985 A 
Why We Need 1Star Wars' 1986 A I 
Agony in Afghanistan A • 
Spetsuaz: The Soviet's Sinister Strike Force A 
Russia's Secret ~ed Shield' A c G 
Hungary's Few Shining Days of Freedom AB G 
Common Sense About Strategic Defense 1988 A c • 
Victory in Afghanistan: the Inside Story c E 
Brilliant Pebbles: Amazing New Missile Killer 1989 A I 
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Notes 
1 Safire, W. (1986) Lesson From Chernobyl RD 129(772), p71. 
2 The appendix provides a complete list of the RD articles on the USSR 
published during the period studied and the discourses of Othern~ which 
72 difCloswre Fall 1991 
-i'HE RUSSIANS ACTED UKE THE RUSSIANS": 
they inwke. It should be noted, however, that these discourses are neither 
discrete nor utilitzed to the same extent in each article. 
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